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Abstract
This paper surveys the causes and macroeconomic consequences of financial instability. It
emphasizes the key role of asymmetric information in causing financial instability and explores
several recent instances of financial crises in industrial and emerging market countries. The
paper then discusses the appropriate macroeconomic policies to reduce the risk of financial insta-
bility and to promote recovery from financial crises, if they have occurred. It argues that Central
Banks should be just as concerned with financial stability as with price stability. It emphasizes
that financial stability is by no means incompatible with the goal of price stability. In fact, price
stability can promote financial stability since it leads to longer duration debt contracts and a
sounder currency.
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Although central bankers focus on price stability - indeed, they are often accused of
having a fixation on price stability - they are and also should be concerned about other
aspects of the macroeconomy, especially the state of the business cycle. An important
fact about the business cycle is that the worst economic contractions are typically asso-
ciated with severe bouts of financial instability. This paper explains how financial
instability can be so devastating to the macroeconomy. A clear implication of this
analysis is that financial stability should also be a central concern for central bankers
and other macroeconomic policymakers.
The paper starts by first outlining an asymmetric information framework for
understanding financial instability, and then shows how financial instability occurs
and harms the macroeconomy. This analysis is then used to describe how financial
instability has operated in recent instances in both industrialized and emerging market
countries to produce severe economic contractions. The paper then goes on to look at
what microeconomic policies need to be implemented to promote financial stability
and to recover from financial instability. It then goes on to discuss what macroeco-
nomic policies are needed to promote recovery of the economy after a severe bout of
financial instability has occurred. The paper ends with some concluding remarks. 
2. Asymmetric Information and the Definition of Financial Instability
Financial markets perform the essential function in an economy of channeling funds
to those individuals or firms that have productive investment opportunities. If the
financial system does not perform this role well, then the economy cannot operate effi-
ciently and economic growth will be severely hampered. A crucial impediment to the
efficient functioning of the financial system is asymmetric information, a situation in
which one party to a financial contract has much less accurate information than the
other party. For example, borrowers who take out loans usually have much better
information about the potential returns and risk associated with the investment proj-
ects they plan to undertake than lenders do. Asymmetric information leads to two basic
problems in the financial system: adverse selection and moral hazard.
Adverse selection is an asymmetric information problem that occurs before the
transaction occurs when potential bad credit risks are the ones who most actively seek
out a loan. Thus, the parties who are the most likely to produce an undesirable
(adverse) outcome are most likely to be selected. For example, those who want to take
on big risks are likely to be the most eager to take out a loan because they know that
they are unlikely to pay it back. Since adverse selection makes it more likely that loans
2might be made to bad credit risks, lenders may decide not to make any loans even
though there are good credit risks in the marketplace. This outcome is a feature of the
classic "lemons problem" analysis first described by Akerlof (1970). Clearly, mini-
mizing the adverse selection problem requires that lenders must screen out good from
bad credit risks.
Moral hazard occurs after the transaction takes place because the lender is sub-
jected to the hazard that the borrower has incentives to engage in activities that are
undesirable (immoral) from the lender's point of view: i.e., activities that make it less
likely that the loan will be paid back. Moral hazard occurs because a borrower has
incentives to invest in projects with high risk in which the borrower does well if the
project succeeds but the lender bears most of the loss if the project fails. Also the bor-
rower has incentives to misallocate funds for her own personal use, to shirk and just
not work very hard, or to undertake investment in unprofitable projects that increase
her power or stature. The conflict of interest between the borrower and lender stem-
ming from moral hazard (the agency problem) implies that many lenders will decide
that they would rather not make loans, so that lending and investment will be at sub-
optimal levels.1 In order to minimize the moral hazard problem, lenders must impose
restrictions (restrictive covenants) on borrowers so that borrowers do not engage in
behavior that makes it less likely that they can pay back the loan; then lenders must
monitor the borrowers' activities and enforce the restrictive covenants if the borrower
violates them. 
In the last twenty years, there has been a growing literature that explains the insti-
tutional structure of financial markets by recognizing that this structure has evolved to
reduce the asymmetric information problems of adverse selection and moral hazard
described above.2 However, even if the financial system is working well at a given
point in time to minimize these asymmetric information problems, this may not con-
tinue in the future. Focusing on information problems leads to the following definition
of financial instability. 
Financial instability occurs when shocks to the financial system interfere
with information flows so that the financial system can no longer do its job
of channeling funds to those with productive investment opportunities.
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1. Asymmetric information is not the only source of the moral hazard problem. Moral hazard can also occur because
high enforcement costs might make it too costly for the lender to prevent moral hazard even when the lender is
fully informed about the borrower's activities.
2. See Gertler (1988) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998).Indeed, if the financial instability is severe enough, it can lead to almost a com-
plete breakdown in the functioning of financial markets, a situation that is then classi-
fied as a financial crisis.
3. Financial Instability and the Macroeconomy
Even though we now have a definition of financial instability, in order to see what pol-
icymakers can do about it, we need to understand why it occurs and how it affects the
economy. The definition of financial instability above suggests that when shocks to the
financial system make adverse selection and moral hazard problems worse, lending to
those with productive investment opportunities dries up. Then, without access to these
funds, individuals and firms cut their spending, resulting in a contraction of econom-
ic activity that can sometimes be quite severe. Four categories of factors lead to
increases in asymmetric information problems and financial instability: deterioration
of financial sector balance sheets, deterioration of balance sheets due to asset price
changes, increases in interest rates, and increases in uncertainty.
3.1. Deterioration in Financial Sector Balance Sheets
One important feature of financial systems is the prominent role played by banking
institutions and other financial intermediaries that make private loans. These financial
intermediaries play such an important role because they are so well suited to reducing
adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets. 
An important reason why asymmetric information problems are hard to eliminate
in financial markets is the free-rider problem. The free-rider problem occurs because
people who do not spend resources on collecting information can still take advantage
of (free ride off) the information that other people have collected. For example, if
some investors acquire information that tells them which securities are undervalued
and then buy these securities, other investors who have not paid for this information
may be able to buy right along with the well-informed investors. If enough free-riding
investors can do this, the increased demand for the undervalued securities will cause
their low price to be bid up to reflect the securities' full net present value given this
information. As a result of all these free riders, investors who have collected informa-
tion will earn less on the securities they purchase and will thus have less incentive to
collect this information. 
Similarly, the free-rider problem reduces the incentive for monitoring and
enforcement of restrictive covenants to reduce moral hazard. Once investors recognize
that other investors in securities can monitor and enforce restrictive covenants, they
4will want to free ride on the other investors' monitoring and enforcement. As a result,
not enough resources will be devoted to monitoring and enforcement. 
Financial intermediaries, of which banks are the most important, are not as sub-
ject to the free-rider problem and profit from the information they produce because
they make private loans that are not traded. Because the loans of financial intermedi-
aries are private, other investors cannot buy them. As a result, investors are less able
to free ride off financial intermediaries and bid up the prices of the loans which would
prevent the intermediary from profiting from its information production activities.
Similarly, it is hard to free ride off these financial intermediaries monitoring activities
when they make private loans. Financial institutions making private loans thus receive
the benefits of monitoring and so are better equipped to prevent moral hazard on the
part of borrowers.
Banks have particular advantages over other financial intermediaries in solving
asymmetric information problems. For example, banks' advantages in information col-
lection activities are enhanced by their ability to engage in long-term customer rela-
tionships and line of credit arrangements. In addition their ability to scrutinize the
checking account balances of their borrowers provides banks with an additional
advantage in monitoring the borrowers' behavior. Banks also have advantages in
reducing moral hazard because, as demonstrated by Diamond (1984), they can engage
in lower cost monitoring than individuals, and because, as pointed out by Stiglitz and
Weiss (1983), they have advantages in preventing risk taking by borrowers since they
can use the threat of cutting off lending in the future to improve a borrower's behav-
ior. Banks' natural advantages in collecting information and reducing moral hazard
explain why banks have such an important role in financial markets throughout the
world. Furthermore, the greater difficulty of acquiring information on private firms in
emerging market countries makes banks even more important in the financial systems
of these countries.3
The discussion above indicates that financial intermediaries, and particularly
banks, have a very important role in financial markets since they are well suited to
engage in information-producing activities that facilitate productive investment for the
economy. Thus, a decline in the ability of these institutions to engage in financial inter-
mediation and make loans will lead directly to a decline in investment and aggregate
economic activity.
The state of banks' balance sheets has an important effect on bank lending. If
banks suffer a deterioration in their balance sheets, and so have a substantial contrac-
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3. Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1994) document that banks play a more important role in the financial systems in
emerging market countries than they do in industrialized countries. tion in their capital, they have two choices: either 1) they can cut back on their lend-
ing in order to shrink their asset base and thereby restore their capital ratios, or 2) they
can try to raise new capital. However, when banks experience deterioration in their
balance sheets, it is very hard for them to raise new capital at a reasonable cost. Thus,
the typical response of banks with weakened balance sheets is a contraction in their
lending, which slows economic activity.
If the deterioration in bank balance sheets is severe enough, however, it can have
even more drastic effects on bank lending if it leads to bank panics, in which there are
multiple, simultaneous failures of banking institutions. Indeed, there is some possibil-
ity that, in the absence of a government safety net, contagion can spread from one bank
failure to another, causing even healthy banks to fail. The source of the contagion is
again asymmetric information. In a panic, depositors, fearing the safety of their
deposits and not knowing the quality of the banks' loan portfolios, withdraw their
deposits from the banking system, causing a contraction in loans and a multiple con-
traction in deposits, which then causes other banks to fail. 
The disappearance of a large number of banks in a short period of time means that
there is a loss of information production in financial markets and a direct loss of finan-
cial intermediation that can be done by the banking sector. The outcome is an even
sharper decline in lending to facilitate productive investments, with a resulting sharp
contraction in economic activity. 
3.2. Deterioration in Balance Sheets Due to Asset Price Changes
The deterioration of balance sheets of both nonfinancial and financial firms due to
changes in asset prices is the major source of financial instability. We describe below
how the deterioration of balance sheets due to collapses in asset prices worsens both
adverse selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets, thus promoting
financial instability. 
An important way that financial markets can solve asymmetric information prob-
lems is with the use of collateral. Collateral reduces the consequences of adverse
selection or moral hazard because it reduces the lender's losses in the case of default.
If a borrower defaults on a loan, the lender can take title and sell the collateral to make
up for the losses on the loan. Thus, if the collateral is of good enough quality, the fact
that there is asymmetric information between borrower and lender is no longer as
important since the loss incurred by the lender if the loan defaults is substantially
reduced.
Net worth performs a similar role to collateral. If a firm has high net worth, even
if it defaults on its debt payments as a result of poor investments, the lender can take
6title to the firm's net worth, sell it off, and use the proceeds to recoup some of the loss-
es from the loan. In addition, the more net worth a firm has in the first place, the less
likely it is to default because the firm has a cushion of assets that it can use to pay off
its loans. High net worth also directly decreases the incentives for borrowers to com-
mit moral hazard because borrowers now have more at stake, and thus more to lose, if
they default on their loans. Hence, when firms seeking credit have high net worth, the
consequences of adverse selection and moral hazard are less important and lenders
will be more willing to make loans. 
Declines in asset prices, both in the land and the stock market have an important
role to play in promoting financial instability through the net worth effects on adverse
selection and moral hazard problems described above. As emphasized by Greenwald
and Stiglitz (1988), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), and Calomiris and Hubbard (1990),
a sharp decline in the stock market, as in a stock market crash, can increase adverse
selection and moral hazard problems in financial markets because it leads to a large
decline in the market value of firms' net worth. (Note that this decline in asset values
could occur either because of expectations of lower future income streams from these
assets or because of a rise in market interest rates that lowers the present discounted
value of future income streams.) The decline in net worth as a result of a stock market
decline makes lenders less willing to lend because, as we have seen, the net worth of
firms has a similar role to collateral, and when the value of collateral declines, it pro-
vides less protection to lenders so that losses from loans are likely to be more severe.
In addition, the decline in corporate net worth as a result of a stock market decline
increases moral hazard incentives for borrowing firms to make risky investments
because these firms now have less to lose if their investments go sour. A decline in the
value of land, which serves as collateral and is also an important asset in many balance
sheets, has similar effects because it lowers firm net worth and directly decreases the
value of collateral. Because borrowers have increased incentives to engage in moral
hazard and because lenders are now less protected against the consequences of adverse
selection, the declines in land and stock markets leads to decreased lending and a
decline economic activity.
In economies in which inflation has been moderate, which characterizes most
industrialized countries, many debt contracts are typically of fairly long duration. In
this institutional environment, an unanticipated decline in inflation leads to a decrease
in the net worth of firms. Debt contracts with long duration have interest payments
fixed in nominal terms for a substantial period of time, with the fixed interest rate
allowing for expected inflation. When inflation turns out to be less than anticipated,
which can occur either because of an unanticipated disinflation as occurred in the
7United States in the early 1980s or by an outright deflation as has occurred in Japan
recently, the value of firms' liabilities in real terms rises so that there is an increased
burden of the debt, but there is no corresponding rise in the real value of firms' assets.
The result is that net worth in real terms declines. A sharp unanticipated disinflation
or deflation therefore causes a substantial decline in real net worth and an increase in
adverse selection and moral hazard problems facing lenders. The resulting increase in
adverse selection and moral hazard problems (of the same type that were discussed in
assessing the effect of net worth declines earlier) will thus also work to cause a decline
in investment and economic activity.
In contrast to the industrialized countries, many emerging market countries have
debt contracts are of very short duration. For example, in many emerging market coun-
tries, almost all bank lending is with variable rate contracts that are usually adjusted
on a monthly basis. With this institutional framework, a decline in unanticipated infla-
tion does not have the unfavorable direct effect on firms' balance sheets that it has in
industrialized countries. The short duration of the debt contracts means that there is
almost no change in the burden of the debt when inflation falls because the terms of
the debt contract are continually repriced to reflect expectations of inflation. Thus, one
mechanism that has played a role in industrialized countries to promote financial
instability has no role in many emerging market countries.
On the other hand, there is another factor affecting balance sheets that can be
extremely important in precipitating financial instability in emerging market countries
that is not operational in most industrialized countries: unanticipated exchange rate
depreciation or devaluation. Because of uncertainty about the future value of the
domestic currency, many nonfinancial firms, banks and governments in emerging mar-
ket countries find it much easier to issue debt if the debt is denominated in foreign cur-
rencies. A substantial amount of debt denominated in foreign currency was a promi-
nent feature of the institutional structure in Chilean financial markets before its finan-
cial crisis in 1982, in Mexico in 1994 and in East Asia in 1997. With this institutional
structure, unanticipated depreciation or devaluation of the domestic currency is anoth-
er factor that can lead to financial instability in emerging market countries and it oper-
ates in a similar fashion to an unanticipated decline in inflation in industrialized coun-
tries. With debt contracts denominated in foreign currency, when there is an unantici-
pated depreciation or devaluation of the domestic currency, the debt burden of domes-
tic firms increases. Since assets are typically denominated in domestic currency, there
is a resulting deterioration in firms' balance sheets and decline in net worth, which then
increases adverse selection and moral hazard problems along the lines described
8above. The increase in asymmetric information problems leads to a decline in invest-
ment and economic activity.
Changes in asset prices can also have serious negative consequences on bank bal-
ance sheets, which we have seen also worsen asymmetric information problems in
financial markets, thereby contributing to financial instability. We have already seen
how increases in interest rates, stock market crashes, an unanticipated decline in infla-
tion (for industrialized countries), or an unanticipated depreciation or devaluation (for
emerging market countries with debt denominated in foreign currencies), can cause a
deterioration in nonfinancial firms' balance sheets that reduces the likelihood of their
repaying their loans. Thus, these factors can help precipitate sharp increases in loan
losses that increase the probability of bank insolvency. In addition, declines in land
prices, which reduce the value of collateral backing of banks' real estate loans, lead to
larger losses when these loan default. Also in some countries, such as Japan, where
banks hold a substantial amount of stock in corporations, a stock market decline leads
to a direct negative effect on bank balance sheets. 
A depreciation or devaluation of the currency in emerging market countries also
leads to a deterioration in bank balance sheets because in these countries banks often
raise funds with liabilities that are denominated in foreign currencies. Thus a depreci-
ation or devaluation of the domestic currency leads to increased indebtedness, while
the value of the banks' assets do not rise.4 The deterioration in banks' equity capital
because of the changes in asset prices mentioned above can lead to substantial declines
in bank lending, thereby increasing asymmetric information problems in the financial
markets which lead to a decline in economic activity.
3.3. Increases in Interest Rates
As demonstrated by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), asymmetric information and the result-
ing adverse selection problem can lead to credit rationing in which some borrowers are
denied loans even when they are willing to pay a higher interest rate. This occurs
because individuals and firms with the riskiest investment projects are exactly those
who are willing to pay the highest interest rates since if the high-risk investment suc-
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4. An important point is that even if banks have a matched portfolio of foreign-currency denominated assets and lia-
bilities and so appear to avoid foreign-exchange market risk, a devaluation can nonetheless cause substantial harm
to bank balance sheets. The reason is that when a devaluation occurs, the offsetting foreign-currency denominat-
ed assets are unlikely to be paid off in full because of the worsening business conditions and the negative effect
that these increases in the value in domestic currency terms of these foreign-currency denominated loans have on
the balance sheet of the borrowing firms. Another way of saying this is that when there is a devaluation, the mis-
match between foreign-currency denominated assets and liabilities on borrowers balance sheets can lead to
defaults on their loans, thereby converting a market risk for borrowers to a credit risk for the banks that have made
the foreign-currency denominated loans. ceeds, they will be the main beneficiaries. Thus, a higher interest rate leads to even
greater adverse selection; that is, the higher interest rate increases the likelihood that
the lender is lending to a bad credit risk. If the lender cannot discriminate among the
borrowers with the riskier investment projects, it may want to cut down the number of
loans it makes which causes the supply of loans to decrease with the higher interest
rate, rather than increase. Thus, even if there is an excess demand for loans, a higher
interest rate will not be able to equilibrate the market because additional increases in
the interest rate will only decrease the supply of loans and make the excess demand for
loans increase even further.
The theory behind credit rationing can be used to show that increases in interest
rates can be one factor that helps precipitate financial instability. If market interest
rates are driven up sufficiently, there is a higher probability that lenders will lend to
bad credit risks, those with the riskiest investment projects, because good credit risks
are less likely to want to borrow while bad credit risks are still willing to borrow.
Because of the resulting increase in adverse selection, lenders will want to make fewer
loans; possibly leading to a steep decline in lending that will lead to a substantial
decline in investment and aggregate economic activity. 
Increases in interest rates also play a role in promoting financial instability
through both firms' and households' balance sheets. As pointed out in Bernanke and
Gertler's (1995) excellent survey of the credit view of monetary transmission, a rise in
interest rates and therefore in households' and firms' interest payments, decreases
firms' cash flow, which causes a deterioration in their balance sheets. As a result,
adverse selection and moral hazard problems become more severe for potential lenders
to these firms and households, leading to a decline in lending and economic activity.
There is thus an additional reason why sharp increases in interest rates can be an
important factor leading to financial instability.
Increases in interest rates can also have a negative effect on bank balance sheets.
Because banks often are engaged in the traditional banking business of "borrowing
short and lending long," they typically have a maturity mismatch with longer duration
assets than liabilities. Thus, a rise in interest rates directly causes a decline in net worth
because the interest-rate rise lowers the value of assets with their longer duration more
than it raises the value of liabilities with their shorter duration. Therefore, even if the
credit quality of bank loans were to remain unaffected, a rise in interest rates causes a
decline in net worth that then leads to a decline in bank lending.
103.4. Increases in Uncertainty
A dramatic increase in uncertainty in financial markets makes it harder for lenders to
screen out good from bad credit risks. The lessened ability of lenders to solve adverse
selection and moral hazard problems renders them less willing to lend, leading to a
decline in lending, investment, and aggregate activity. Although this increase in uncer-
tainty can stem from a failure of a prominent financial or nonfinancial institution or a
recession, in recent episodes of financial instability in emerging market countries,
uncertainty about government policies seems to have played a more prominent role. 
4. Recent Episodes of Financial Instability
Now that we understand how financial instability occurs and can damage the macro-
economy, we can use our asymmetric information analysis to explain recent dramatic
episodes of financial instability in Japan, Mexico and the East Asian crisis countries
of Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and the Philippines.5
There are two major institutional differences in the financial markets of industri-
alized countries versus emerging market countries that imply differences in how finan-
cial instability is propagated through the economy in these two types of countries. As
mentioned earlier, in industrialized countries like Japan, where inflation typically has
been low and not very variable, many debt contracts are of long duration. Furthermore,
because these industrialized countries typically retain a strong currency, most debt
contracts are denominated in the domestic currency. In contrast, many emerging mar-
ket countries like Mexico and the East Asian countries, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia,
South Korea, and the Philippines, have had often had high and variable inflation rates
in the past and so long-term debt or debt denominated in domestic currency is too
risky. The result has been a debt structure of very short duration, which is often
denominated in foreign currency. 
These two different types of institutional structures lead to somewhat different
explanations of how financial instability developed and then led to an economic con-
traction in industrialized countries, like Japan, and emerging market countries, like
Mexico or the East Asian crisis countries.6
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5. The asymmetric information analysis we present here also applies to earlier episodes of financial crisis such as
those that occurred in the United States (e.g., see Mishkin, 1991) and Chile (see Diaz-Alejandro, 1985).
6. For recent discussions of how financial instability developed in Japan, see Posen (1999) and Mishkin (1999a), in
Mexico see Mishkin (1996a), and in East Asia see Goldstein (1998), Radelet and Sachs (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti
and Roubini (1998), World Bank (1998) and Mishkin (1999a).4.1. Japan
Japan began to experience financial instability and economic stagnation after the col-
lapse of the stock and land markets with the bursting of the "bubble economy". One
factor promoting financial instability was the decline in net worth of nonfinancial
firms because of lower stock and bond prices increased adverse selection and moral
hazard problems in financial markets because the effective collateral in the firms had
decreased. In addition, the decline in net worth meant that the incentives for borrow-
ers to take on risk at the expense of the lender had increased. The result of the decline
in net worth was thus an increase in asymmetric information problems, which led to a
contraction in lending and output in the Japanese economy. One of the results of the
decline has been economic stagnation for nearly ten years. 
As we have seen, banks have a very important role in financial markets since they
are well suited to engage in information-producing activities that facilitate productive
investment for the economy. Thus, a decline in the ability of banks to engage in finan-
cial intermediation and make loans caused by a deterioration in bank balance sheets as
happened in Japan led directly to a decline in investment and aggregate economic
activity.
Negative shocks to banks' balance sheets in Japan took two three basic forms.
First, because Japanese banks hold a substantial amount of equities, declines in the
stock market have had a direct negative impact on Japanese bank balance sheets.
Second, we have already seen how stock market and land market crashes can cause a
deterioration in nonfinancial firms' balance sheets that reduces the likelihood of their
repaying their loans. Thus, these factors can help precipitate sharp increases in loan
losses that increase the probability of bank insolvency. Third, weak bank balance
sheets can also occur because the supervisory/regulatory structure has not worked well
enough to restrain excessive risk-taking on the part of banks.
With the liberalization of Japanese financial markets in the 1980s, Japanese banks
suddenly found themselves in a more competitive environment. In an attempt to main-
tain adequate profit levels, a natural response was to take on riskier loans with high
profit margins.7 The incentives to do this were enhanced by the presence of a govern-
ment safety net, which protected depositors and even large creditors if these risky
loans turned sour and led to bank insolvencies. Knowing that the government would
come to the rescue meant that depositors and other creditors had little incentive to
monitor the banks and prevent them from taking on too much risk. The result was a
well-known moral hazard problem in which the Japanese banks had increased incen-
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7. A similar phenomenon has occurred in the United States and in other countries. See Edwards and Mishkin (1995).tives to increase their risk exposure and this is exactly what they did, especially in their
lending to the real estate sector. In order to prevent this from occurring, Japanese bank-
ing supervisors had to monitor banks closely and prevent them from engaging in
excessive risk-taking. However, this did not happen.
An important reason why the regulatory/supervisory process did not work well is
explained by recognizing that the relationship between the voters-taxpayers, on the
one hand, and the regulators and politicians, on the other, creates a particular type of
moral hazard problem, the principal-agent problem. The principal-agent problem
occurs when agents have different incentives from the person they work for (the prin-
cipal) and so act in their own interest rather than in the interest of their employer.
Regulators and politicians are ultimately agents for voters-taxpayers (principals)
because in the final analysis taxpayers bear the cost of any losses when the safety net
is invoked. The principal-agent problem occurs because the agent (a politician or reg-
ulator) may not have the same incentives to minimize costs to the economy as the prin-
cipal (the taxpayer).
To act in the taxpayer's interest, regulators/supervisors have several tasks. In order
to restrict excessive risk-taking they must set restrictions on holding assets that are too
risky, impose sufficiently high capital requirements, and close down insolvent institu-
tions. However, because of the principal-agent problem, regulators have incentives to
do the opposite and engage in regulatory forbearance, in which they forego the right
to enforce regulations or close down insolvent institutions. One important incentive
for regulators that explains this phenomenon is their desire to escape blame for poor
performance of their agency. By loosening capital requirements and pursuing regula-
tory forbearance, regulators can hide the problem of an insolvent bank and hope that
the situation will improve. Kane (1989) characterizes such behavior on the part of reg-
ulators as "bureaucratic gambling". Another important incentive for regulators is that
they may want to protect their careers by acceding to pressures from politicians. The
failures of the Ministry of Finance to properly regulate and supervise Japanese banks
in recent years is an excellent example of the principal-agent problem at work, and the
result has been huge loan losses in the banking sector, which now exceed $500 bil-
lion.8
As we have seen above, a deterioration in banks' balance sheets leads to a decline
in lending and in economic activity. Research in the United States, suggests, for exam-
ple, that this mechanism was operational during the early 1990s in the United States
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8. This principal-agent problem was also extremely important in producing the savings and loan debacle in the
United States (e.g., see Kane, 1989).when the capital crunch led to the headwinds which hindered growth in the U.S. econ-
omy at that time.9 We are seeing a similar phenomenon in recent years in Japan.
Another source of financial instability in Japan has been deflation, which led to a
decrease in the net worth of firms because debt contracts are denominated in domes-
tic currency and are typically of fairly long duration. Deflation led to a rise in the value
of firms' liabilities in real terms so that there was an increased burden of the debt, with
the result that it caused a further decline in real net worth and an increase in adverse
selection and moral hazard problems facing lenders. The resulting increase in adverse
selection and moral hazard problems described earlier thus also worked to cause a
decline in investment and economic activity. The deflation that has occurred in recent
years in Japan, although not nearly as severe as that which occurred during the Great
Depression in the United States in the 1930s, has thus helped prolong the malaise in
the economy.
4.2. Mexico and the East Asia Crisis Countries
Consistent with the Japanese experience, stock market declines and increases in uncer-
tainty were factors precipitating the full-blown crises in Mexico, Thailand and South
Korea. (The stock market declines in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines occurred
simultaneously with the onset of the crisis.) The Mexican economy was hit by politi-
cal shocks in 1994 that created uncertainty, specifically the assassination of Luis
Donaldo Colosio, the ruling party's presidential candidate, and an uprising in the
southern state of Chiapas. By the middle of December 1994, stock prices on the Bolsa
(stock exchange) had fallen nearly 20% from their September 1994 peak. In January
1997, a major Korean chaebol (conglomerate), Hanbo Steel, collapsed; it was the first
bankruptcy of a chaebol in a decade. Shortly thereafter, Sammi Steel and Kia Motors
also declared bankruptcy. In Thailand, Samprosong Land, a major real estate develop-
er, defaulted on its foreign debt in early February 1997, and financial institutions that
had lent heavily in the real estate market began to encounter serious difficulties,
requiring over $8 billion of loans from the Thai central bank to prop them up. Finally,
in June, the failure of a major Thai finance company, Finance One, imposed substan-
tial losses on both domestic and foreign creditors. These events increased general
uncertainty in the financial markets of Thailand and South Korea, and both experi-
enced substantial declines in their securities markets. From peak values in early 1996,
Korean stock prices fell by 25% and Thai stock prices fell by 50%.
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Peek and Rosengren (1995) and the symposium published in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly
Review in the spring of 1993, Federal Reserve Bank of New York (1993).As we have seen, an increase in uncertainty and a decrease in net worth as a result
of a stock market decline increase asymmetric information problems. It becomes hard-
er to screen out good from bad borrowers, and the decline in net worth decreases the
value of firms' collateral and increases their incentives to make risky investments
because there is less equity to lose if the investments are unsuccessful. The increase in
uncertainty and stock market declines that occurred before the crisis, along with the
deterioration in banks' balance sheets, worsened adverse selection and moral hazard
problems and made the economies ripe for a serious financial crisis.
Another precipitating factor to the Mexican (but not East Asian) financial crisis
was a rise in interest rates abroad. Beginning in February 1994, the Federal Reserve
began to raise the federal funds rate to head off inflationary pressures. Although the
policy was quite successful in keeping inflation in check in the United States, it put
upward pressure on Mexican interest rates, thereby increasing asymmetric information
problems in the Mexican financial system. Furthermore, the Mexican central bank, the
Banco de Mexico, raised interest rates to protect the value of the peso in the foreign
exchange market. The rise in interest rates directly added to increased adverse selec-
tion in Mexican financial markets because, as discussed earlier, it made it more likely
that the parties willing to take on the most risk would seek loans.
Probably the most important factor behind the financial crises in Mexico and East
Asia was the financial liberalization in these countries that resulted in the lending
boom, which was fed by capital inflows. Once restrictions were lifted on both interest-
rate ceilings and the type of lending allowed, lending increased dramatically. The
problem with the resulting lending boom was not that lending expanded, but that it
expanded so rapidly that excessive risk-taking was the result, with large losses on
loans in the future. 
There are two reasons why excessive risk-taking occurred after the financial lib-
eralization in Mexico and the East Asian crisis countries. The first is that managers of
banking and other similar financial institutions often lacked the expertise to manage
risk appropriately when new lending opportunities opened up after financial liberal-
ization. In addition, with rapid growth of lending, banking institutions could not add
the necessary managerial capital (well-trained loan officers, risk-assessment systems,
etc.) fast enough to enable these institutions to screen and monitor these new loans
appropriately.
The second reason why excessive risk-taking occurred was the inadequacy of the
regulatory/supervisory system as in Japan. Mexico and the crisis countries in East Asia
were notorious for weak financial regulation and supervision. (In contrast, the noncri-
sis countries in East Asia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan had very strong pru-
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on risk, these weak regulatory/supervisory systems could not limit the moral hazard
created by the government safety net and excessive risk-taking is the result. This prob-
lem was made even more severe by the rapid credit growth in a lending boom, which
stretched the resources of the bank supervisors. Bank supervisory agencies were also
unable to add to their supervisory capital (well-trained examiners and information sys-
tems) fast enough to enable them to keep up with their increased responsibilities both
because they had to monitor new activities of the banks, but also because these activ-
ities were expanding at a rapid pace. 
Capital inflows made this problem even worse. Once financial liberalization is
adopted, foreign capital flew into banks in these emerging market countries because it
earned high yields but was likely to be protected by the government safety net,
whether it was going to be provided by the government of the emerging market coun-
try or by international agencies such as the IMF. The result was that capital inflows
fueled a lending boom, which led to excessive risk-taking on the part of banks. The
capital inflow problem was further stimulated by exchange-rate pegs, which, by pro-
viding a more stable value of the currency, might have given foreign investors a sense
of lower risk.10 In Mexico and East Asia capital inflows averaged from 5 to over 10%
of GDP in the three years leading up to the crisis. Folkerts-Landau, et. al (1995), for
example, found that emerging market countries in the Asian-Pacific region with large
net private capital inflows also experienced large increases in their banking sectors. 
There are two ways in which the lending boom arising after financial liberaliza-
tion led to the financial crises in Mexico and East Asia. First, the excessive risk-tak-
ing led to substantial loan losses before the crisis: as mentioned in Mishkin (1997) and
Goldstein (1998), Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand all had nonperforming loans
that exceeded 10% of total lending, while the Philippines, Malaysia and Mexico had
nonperforming loans between 5 and 10% of total lending. Indeed, these figures are
likely to be substantially understated because accounting principles for nonperforming
loans in emerging market countries are far more lax than in the United States. Once
the resulting deterioration in the balance sheets of banking firms became apparent,
they were forced to restrict their lending in order to improve their capital ratios.
Second, the deterioration in bank balance sheets promoted a currency crisis
because it became very difficult for the central bank to defend its currency against a
speculative attack. As was mentioned earlier, any rise in interest rates to keep the
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10. The encouragement of capital inflows that lead to excessive risk-taking resulting from exchange-rate pegs sug-
gests one reason why using exchange-rate pegs for stabilization purposes in emerging market countries may be
highly problematic. See Mishkin (1998).domestic currency from depreciating has the additional effect of weakening the bank-
ing system further because the rise in interest rates hurts banks' balance sheets. This
negative effect of a rise in interest rates on banks' balance sheets occurs because of
their maturity mismatch and their exposure to increased credit risk when the economy
deteriorates. Thus, when a speculative attack on the currency occurs in an emerging
market country, if the central bank raises interest rates sufficiently to defend the cur-
rency, the banking system may collapse. Once investors recognize that a country's
weak banking system makes it less likely that the central bank will take the steps to
successfully defend the domestic currency, they have even greater incentives to attack
the currency because expected profits from selling the currency have now risen. Thus,
with a weakened banking sector, a successful speculative attack is likely to material-
ize.11
The weakened state of the banking sector along with the high degree of illiquidi-
ty in Mexico and East Asian countries before the crisis, then set the stage for the cur-
rency crisis. With these vulnerabilities, speculative attacks on the currency could have
been triggered by any of many factors, a large current account being just one of them.
In the Mexican case, the attacks came in the wake of political instability, such as the
assassination of political candidates and an uprising in Chiapas. Even though the
Mexican central bank intervened in the foreign exchange market and raised interest
rates sharply, it was unable to stem the attack and was forced to devalue the peso on
December 20, 1994. In the case of Thailand, the attacks followed unsuccessful
attempts of the government to shore up the financial system, culminating in the failure
of Finance One, a large finance company, in June 1997. Eventually, the inability of the
central bank to defend the currency because the required measures would do too much
harm to the weakened financial sector meant that the attacks could not be resisted. The
outcome was a successful speculative attack that forced the Thai central bank to allow
the baht to float downward. Soon thereafter, speculative attacks developed against the
other countries in the region, leading to the collapse of the Philippine peso, the
Indonesian rupiah, the Malaysian ringgit, and the South Korean won.
The currency crises in Mexico and East Asia helped trigger the next stage of
financial instability, a full-fledged financial crisis. The institutional structure of debt
markets in Mexico and East Asia now interacted with the currency devaluations to
increase asymmetric information problems in credit markets, and so led to the finan-
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substantial fiscal deficits in the future. Even though their story involves fiscal deficits, from a policy perspective,
it leads to the same conclusion that it was not poor macroeconomic policies that lead to the crises, but rather poor
micro policies in the financial sector.cial crises. Because so many firms in these countries had debt denominated in foreign
currencies like the dollar and the yen, depreciation of their currencies resulted in
increases in their indebtedness in domestic currency terms, even though the value of
their assets remained unchanged. When the peso lost half its value by March 1995 and
the Thai, Philippine, Malaysian, and South Korean currencies lost between a third and
half of their value by the beginning of 1998, firms' balance sheets took a big negative
hit, which caused a dramatic increase in adverse selection and moral hazard problems.
This negative shock was most severe for Indonesia, which saw the value of its curren-
cy fall by an astronomical 80%, resulting in insolvency for any firm with substantial
amounts of debt denominated in foreign currencies.
The collapse of currencies also led to a rise in actual and expected inflation in two
of the countries; Mexico and Indonesia, where inflation rates climbed to over 50%.
(Thailand, Malaysia and South Korea have avoided a large rise in inflation, which par-
tially explains their better performance relative to Indonesia.) The rise in expected
inflation after the currency crises in Mexico and Indonesia led to a sharp rise in inter-
est rates which, given the short-duration of debt, led to huge increases in interest pay-
ments by firms. As noted before, a feature of debt markets in emerging-market coun-
tries, like those in Mexico and Indonesia, is that debt contracts have very short dura-
tions, typically less than one month. Thus the rise in short-term interest rates in these
countries meant that the effect on cash flow and hence on balance sheets was substan-
tial. As our asymmetric information analysis suggests this deterioration in households'
and firms' balance sheets increased adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the
credit markets, making lenders even less willing to lend. 
These asymmetric information problems were severe not only for domestic
lenders but for foreign lenders as well because they had difficulty obtaining informa-
tion regarding these economies. Foreign lenders were thus eager to pull their funds out
of Mexico and the East Asian crisis countries, and that is what they did. Foreign port-
folio investment inflows to Mexico, which had been on the order of $20 billion a year
in 1993, reversed course, and the outflows exceeded $10 billion a year by the fourth
quarter of 1994. Similarly in East Asia, capital flows for Thailand, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Indonesia, and South Korea reversed from an inflow of close to $100 bil-
lion in 1996 to an outflow of more than $10 billion in 1997. Consistent with the theo-
ry of financial crises outlined in this chapter, the sharp decline in lending helped lead
to a collapse of economic activity, with real GDP growth falling sharply.
Further deterioration in the economy occurred because the collapse in economic
activity and the deterioration in the cash flow and balance sheets of both firms and
households led to a worsening banking crisis. The problems of firms and households
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stantial losses for the banks. Even more problematic for the banks was that they had
many short-term liabilities denominated in foreign currencies, and the sharp increase
in the value of these liabilities after the devaluation lead to a further deterioration in
the banks' balance sheets. Under these circumstances, the banking system would have
collapsed in the absence of a government safety net - as it did in the United States dur-
ing the Great Depression, but with the assistance of the International Monetary Fund,
these countries were in some cases able to protect depositors and avoid a bank panic.
However, given the loss of bank capital and the need for the government to intervene
to prop up the banks, the banks' ability to lend was nevertheless sharply curtailed. In
the case of Indonesia, a bank panic did occur, forcing banks to go out of business, mak-
ing the decline in lending and the financial crisis even worse. As we have seen, the
reduction in bank lending makes adverse selection and moral hazard problems worse
in financial markets because banks are less capable of playing their traditional finan-
cial intermediation role. The banking crisis, along with other factors that increased
adverse selection and moral hazard problems in the credit markets of Mexico and East
Asia, explains the collapse of lending and hence economic activity in the aftermath of
the crisis.
5. Microeconomic Polices to Prevent Financial Instability
The asymmetric information analysis of the relationship between financial instability
and the macroeconomy is not only of academic interest but also has many important
lessons for policymakers, particularly those in central banks. Here we focus on domes-
tic microeconomic policies that help prevent financial instability, and in the next two
sections examine domestic policies that help promote recovery from bouts of financial
instability. There are additional implications of the analysis here for international
financial architecture, specifically, what should be the choice of exchange rate regime,
whether capital liberalization or controls are appropriate and what should be the role
of the International Monetary Fund in crisis management, but because of space limi-
tations these are better left to discussion elsewhere (e.g., see Mishkin, 1999a and
forthcoming, and Eichengreen, 1999).
There are two basic categories of microeconomic policies to prevent financial
instability that we examine here: regulation and supervision of the financial system
and how financial liberalization should be managed. Only a brief description of the
policies in these categories is discussed here. A more detailed discussion can be found
in Mishkin (forthcoming).
195.1. Regulation and Supervision of the Financial System
As we have seen, financial institutions, particularly banks, play a particularly impor-
tant role in the financial systems of both industrialized and particularly emerging mar-
ket and transition countries' financial systems, and thus problems in the financial sec-
tor are a particularly important source of financial instability. Indeed, we have seen
that deterioration in financial firms' balance sheets is an important precursor of finan-
cial crises, especially in emerging market countries. There, problems in the financial
and particularly in the banking sector can make a foreign exchange crisis more likely,
which in turn leads to a full blown financial crisis. Our asymmetric information frame-
work suggests that there is an important need for a government safety net for the bank-
ing system in order to prevent bank panics. However, a safety net nonetheless increas-
es the moral hazard incentives for excessive risk-taking on the part of the banks. All
governments therefore need to pay particular attention to creating and sustaining a
strong bank regulatory/supervisory system to reduce excessive risk-taking in their
financial systems.
Encouraging a strong bank regulatory/supervisory system takes ten basic forms:
1. Adequate Resources and Statutory Authority for Bank Regulators/Supervisors
Bank regulatory/supervisory agencies need to be provided with adequate resources
and the statutory authority (the ability to issue cease and desist orders and to close
down insolvent banks) to do their job effectively. Without these resources, the bank
supervisory agency will not be able to monitor banks sufficiently in order to keep them
from engaging in inappropriately risky activities, to have the appropriate management
expertise and controls to manage risk, or to have sufficient capital so that moral haz-
ard incentives to take on excessive risk are kept in check. Indeed, this inability to mon-
itor banking institutions sufficiently not surprisingly has occurred in many emerging
market and transition countries (Mexico and East Asia being recent examples), but it
has also been a very serious problem in industrialized countries. The resistance to pro-
viding the savings and loan supervisory agencies with adequate resources to hire suf-
ficient bank examiners by the U.S. Congress was a key factor in making the S&L cri-
sis in the United States in the 1980s much worse. The inadequacy of bank supervision
in Japan and the problems it has caused are well-known, with the lack of resources for
bank supervision exemplified by the fact that the number of bank examiners in Japan
is on the order of 400 in contrast to around 7,000 in the United States.
202. Prompt Corrective Action
Prompt corrective action by bank supervisors will stop undesirable bank activities and,
even more importantly, not only close down institutions that do not have sufficient net
worth, but also make sure that stockholders and managers of insolvent institutions are
appropriately punished. Prompt corrective action is particularly important in part
because it immediately prevents banks from "betting the bank" in order to restore the
value of the institution, and in part because it creates incentives for banks not to take
on too much risk in the first place, knowing that if they do so, they are more likely to
be punished.
3. Focus on Risk Management
The traditional approach to bank supervision has focused on the quality of the bank's
balance sheet at a point in time and whether the bank complies with capital require-
ments. Although the traditional focus is important for reducing excessive risk-taking
by banks, it may no longer be adequate. First is the point that capital may be extreme-
ly hard to measure. Furthermore, in today's world, financial innovation has produced
new markets and instruments, which make it easy for banks and their employees to
make huge bets quickly. In this new financial environment, a bank that is quite healthy
at a particular point in time can be driven into insolvency extremely rapidly from trad-
ing losses, as has been forcefully demonstrated by the failure of Barings in 1995
which, although initially well capitalized, was brought down by a rogue trader in a
matter of months. Thus an examination which focuses only on a bank's position at a
point in time may not be effective in indicating whether a bank will in fact be taking
on excessive risk in the near future. As a result, bank examiners now need to place far
greater emphasis on evaluating the soundness of bank's management processes with
regard to controlling risk. Bank examiners need to make sure that best practice in risk
management spreads throughout the banking industry by forcing banks with poor risk
management procedures to get them up to speed. 
4. Entry of Foreign Banks
Many countries have restrictions on the entry of foreign banks. Rather than seeing for-
eign banks as a threat, their entry should be seen as an opportunity to strengthen the
banking system. In all but a few large countries, domestic banks are unable to diversi-
fy because their lending is concentrated in the home country. In contrast, foreign banks
have more diversified portfolios and also usually have access to sources of funds from
all over the world through their parent company. This diversification means that these
foreign banks are exposed to less risk and are less affected by negative shocks to the
21home country's economy and encouraging entry of foreign banks is thus likely to lead
to a banking and financial system that is substantially less fragile and far less prone to
crisis. In addition, encouraging entry of foreign banks can encourage adoption of best
practice in the banking industry because when bank examiners in a country see better
practices in risk management, they can ensure their spread.
5. Independence of the Bank Regulatory/Supervisory Agency
Because prompt corrective action is so important, the bank regulatory/supervisory
agency needs sufficient independence from the political process so that it is not
encouraged to sweep problems under the rug and engage in regulatory forbearance.
One way to ensure against regulatory forbearance is to give the bank supervisory role
to a politically independent central bank. This has desirable elements as pointed out in
Mishkin (1992), but some central banks might not want to have the supervisory task
thrust upon them because they worry that it might increase the likelihood that the cen-
tral bank would be politicized, thereby impinging on the independence of the central
bank. Alternatively, bank supervisory activities could be housed in a bank regulatory
authority that is independent of the government. 
6. Accountability of Bank Supervisors
It is also important to make bank supervisors accountable if they engage in regulatory
forbearance in order to improve incentives for them to do their job properly. For exam-
ple, as pointed out in Mishkin (1997), an important but very often overlooked part of
FDICIA which has helped make this legislation effective is that there is a mandatory
report that the supervisory agencies must produce if the bank failure imposes costs on
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The resulting report is made avail-
able to any member of Congress and to the general public upon request, and the
General Accounting Office must do an annual review of these reports. Opening up the
actions of bank supervisors to public scrutiny makes regulatory forbearance less
attractive to them, thereby reducing the principal-agent problem. In addition, subject-
ing the actions of bank supervisors to public scrutiny reduces the incentives of politi-
cians to lean on supervisors to relax their supervision of banks.
7. Limiting Too-Big-To-Fail
Because the failure of a very large bank makes it more likely that a major, systemic
financial disruption will occur, bank supervisors are naturally reluctant to allow a big
bank to fail and cause losses to depositors. The result is that most countries either
explicitly or implicitly have a too-big-to-fail policy in which all depositors at a big
22bank, both insured and uninsured are fully protected if the bank fails. The problem
with the too-big-to-fail policy is that it reduces market discipline on big banks and thus
increases their moral hazard incentives to take on excessive risk.12 Dealing with the
quandary of not wanting to allow a large bank failure to destabilize the financial sys-
tem, while keeping the moral hazard problem created by a too-big-to-fail policy under
control is indeed a difficult one, and requires careful thought and attention by bank
regulators and supervisors. Elsewhere I have outlined a proposal for how to cope with
this quandary (Mishkin, 1999b), and it is well beyond the scope of this paper to go into
this topic in detail. 
8. Accounting and Disclosure Requirements
Accounting and disclosure requirements for financial institutions, which are often par-
ticularly lacking in emerging market countries, but in a number of industrialized coun-
tries as well, need to be beefed up considerably. Without the appropriate information,
both markets and bank and other financial institution supervisors will not be able to
adequately monitor the banks to deter excessive risk-taking.13 In addition, adequate
accounting and disclosure requirements are necessary if the market is to have enough
information to monitor financial institutions so that they can prevent excessive risk
taking. Proper accounting standards and disclosure requirements are therefore crucial
to both market-based and supervisory discipline that can help prevent financial insta-
bility.
9. Restrictions on Connected Lending
A particular problem in the banking sector, particularly in emerging market and tran-
sition countries, is connected lending, lending to banks' owners or managers or their
business associates. Banks clearly have less incentives to monitor loans to their own-
ers or managers, thus increasing the moral hazard incentives for the borrowers to take
on excessive risk, thereby exposing the bank to potential loan losses. In addition, con-
nected lending in which large loans are made to one party can result in a lack of diver-
sification for the bank, thus increasing the risk exposure of the bank. Regulations
against connected lending are clearly necessary to reduce banks risk exposure in order
to prevent financial instability.
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13. The importance of disclosure is illustrated in a recent paper by Garber and Lall (1996), which suggests that off
balance-sheet and off-shore derivatives contracts played an important role in the Mexican crisis.10. Legal and Judicial Systems
The legal and judicial systems are very important for promoting the efficient func-
tioning of the financial system and the inadequacies of legal systems in many coun-
tries are a serious problem for financial markets. If property rights are unclear or hard
to enforce, the process of financial intermediation can be severely hampered.
Collateral can be an effective mechanism to reduce adverse selection and moral haz-
ard problems in credit markets because it reduces the system prevents the use of cer-
tain assets as collateral or makes attaching collateral a costly and time-consuming
process, thereby reducing the effectiveness of collateral to solve asymmetric informa-
tion problems.14 Similarly, bankruptcy procedures in developing countries are fre-
quently very cumbersome (or even nonexistent), resulting in lengthy delays in resolv-
ing conflicting claims. Resolution of bankruptcies in which the books of insolvent
firms are opened up and assets are redistributed can be viewed as a process to decrease
asymmetric information in the marketplace. Furthermore, slow resolution of bank-
ruptcies can delay recovery from a financial crisis because only when bankruptcies
have been resolved is there enough information in the financial system to restore it to
a healthy operation.
5.2. Financial Liberalization
Deregulation and liberalization of the financial system have swept through almost all
countries in recent years. Although deregulation and liberalization are highly desirable
objectives, the asymmetric information framework in this paper indicates that if this
process is not managed properly, it can be disastrous. If the proper bank
regulatory/supervisory structure, accounting and disclosure requirements, restrictions
on connected lending, and well-functioning legal and judicial systems are not in place
when liberalization comes, the appropriate constraints on risk-taking behavior will be
far too weak. The result will be that bad loans are likely, with potentially disastrous
consequences for bank balance sheets at some point in the future. 
In addition, before liberalization occurs, banks may not have the expertise to
make loans wisely, and so opening them up to new lending opportunities may also lead
to poor quality of the loan portfolio. We have also seen that financial deregulation and
liberalization often lead to a lending boom, because of both increased opportunities for
bank lending and financial deepening in which more funds flow into the banking sys-
tem. Although financial deepening is a positive development for the economy in the
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14. For example, see Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod (1994).long run, in the short run the lending boom may outstrip the available information
resources in the financial system, helping to promote a financial collapse in the future. 
The dangers in financial deregulation and liberalization do not mean that coun-
tries should not pursue a liberalization strategy. To the contrary, financial liberalization
is critical to the efficient functioning of financial markets so that they can channel
funds to those with the most productive investment opportunities. Getting funds to
those with the most productive investment opportunities is especially critical to emerg-
ing market countries because these investments can have especially high returns,
thereby stimulating rapid economic growth. However, proper sequencing of financial
deregulation and liberalization is critical to its success. It is important that policymak-
ers put in place the proper institutional structure before liberalizing their financial sys-
tems, especially if there are no restrictions on financial institutions seeking funds
abroad or issuing foreign-denominated debt. Before financial markets are fully liber-
alized, it is crucial that the precepts outlined above be implemented: provision of suf-
ficient resources and statutory authority to bank supervisors, adoption of prompt cor-
rective action provisions, an appropriate focus on risk management, independence of
bank regulators/supervisors from short-run political pressure, increased accountability
of bank supervisors, limitations on too-big-to-fail, adoption of adequate accounting
standards and disclosure requirements, sufficient restrictions on connected lending,
improvements in the legal and judicial systems, and encouragement of entry of foreign
banks. 
Because the above measures are not easy to install quickly and because of the
stresses that rapid expansion of the financial sector puts on both managerial and super-
visory resources, policymakers probably need to restrict the growth of credit when
financial liberalization is put into place. This can take the form of putting upper lim-
its on loan-to-value ratios, or for consumer credit, setting maximum repayment peri-
ods and minimum downpayment percentages. Banks could also be restricted in how
fast certain types of their loan portfolios are allowed to grow. As the appropriate infra-
structure is put into place, these restrictions could and should be reduced. The bottom
line is that, although eventually a full financial liberalization should be the goal, finan-
cial liberalization needs to proceed at a measured pace, with some restrictions imposed
along the way.
256. Microeconomic Policies to Promote Recovery from Financial 
Instability
We have already seen that weak balance sheets in financial firms such as banks cause
them to restrict their lending activities, which leads to worse asymmetric information
problems in financial markets, and is thus a severe drag on the economy. A key ele-
ment in restoring both the financial system and the economy back to health is a recap-
italization of the financial sector. Financial institutions cannot raise new capital when
the economy is undergoing a bout of financial instability because private capital does
not gravitate to institutions in financial distress. Thus to restore the financial system
back to health, the government must step in quickly to provide funds to recapitalize
these institutions. 
However, just supplying capital to financial institutions is not sufficient to restore
confidence and restart the financial system, it must be done in the right way.
Confidence will only be restored if markets believe that financial institutions will not
continue taking excessive risk. Thus the moral hazard created by the safety net and the
recapitalization of the financial sector must be limited by the measures that we have
discussed in the previous section to improve the regulation and supervision of the
financial system. Indeed, starting a process to implement these measures is an impor-
tant strategy to help promote recovery from financial instability. In addition, funds
must not be supplied to weak or insolvent banking institutions to keep them afloat. To
do so will just be throwing away good taxpayer money after bad. In the long-run,
injecting public funds into weak banks does not deliver a restoration of the balance
sheets of the banking system because these weak banks continue to be weak and have
strong moral hazard incentives to take on big risks at the taxpayers' expense because
they have little to lose if their bets go wrong. The way to recapitalize the banking sys-
tem is to close down all insolvent and weak institutions and sell off their assets to
healthy institutions with public funds used to make the assets whole. If this is not pos-
sible, the assets of these closed banks must be sold off as promptly as possible, so that
the assets can be quickly put to productive uses by the private sector. Only when the
banking system is fully recapitalized and unhealthy banks put out of their misery, can
sustained recovery begin.
267. Macroeconomic Policies to Promote Recovery from Financial 
Instability
Our discussion of financial instability and the macroeconomy indicates that there is a
crucial difference in the structure of debt markets that results in a different propaga-
tion of financial instability in emerging market versus industrialized countries: In
industrialized countries debt contracts are generally denominated in domestic curren-
cy and are often long term, while in emerging market countries the opposite is the case
- debt is often denominated in foreign currency and is always short-term. The impli-
cation of our asymmetric information analysis is thus that very different macroeco-
nomic policies are needed to promote recovery from financial instability in emerging
market versus industrialized countries. Indeed what are appropriate policies for indus-
trialized countries are exactly the wrong medicine for emerging market countries. 
7.1. Industrialized Countries 
We have already seen that destruction of balance sheets is the key factor that produces
financial instability. Thus the asymmetric information analysis of financial instability
presented here indicates that macroeconomic policies to promote recovery must focus
on restoring balance sheets to health. With the institutional structure of debt markets
in industrialized countries, expansionary monetary policy that injects liquidity
(reserves) into the financial system is the most direct way to restore balance sheets.
Injecting reserves, either through open market operations or by lending to the banking
sector, causes the money supply to increase, which in turns leads to a higher price
level. Given that debt contracts are denominated in domestic currency and many debt
contracts are of fairly long duration, the higher price level produces the opposite of the
unanticipated disinflation mechanism described earlier. The reflation of the economy
causes the debt burden of households and firms to fall, thereby increasing their net
worth. As outlined earlier, higher net worth then leads to reduced adverse selection and
moral hazard problems in financial markets, undoing the increase in adverse selection
and moral hazard problems induced by the financial crisis. In addition, injecting liq-
uidity into the economy raises asset prices such as land and stock market values, which
also cause an improvement in net worth and a reduction in adverse selection and moral
hazard problems. Also, expansionary monetary policy promotes economic recovery
through other mechanisms involving the stock market and the foreign exchange mar-
ket.15
A common fallacy is that monetary policy is ineffective if interest rates are close
to zero, as has been recently true in Japan, and thus expansionary monetary policy
27might not be able to promote recovery. A deeper understanding of the transmission
mechanisms of monetary policy (e.g., see Mishkin, 1996a) and careful study of the
Great Depression era in the United States when interest rates were also near zero
(Friedman and Schwartz, 1963, and Romer, 1992) indicates that this view is just plain
wrong.16 Expansionary monetary policy to increase liquidity in the economy can be
achieved with open market purchases, which do not have to be solely in shortterm
domestic government securities. Unsterilized purchases of foreign exchange can also
do the trick. Even with interest rates at zero, expansionary monetary policy lifts the
prices of assets, such as land and equities, which lead to increases in aggregate
demand, while it also leads to currency depreciation which also increases aggregate
demand because it stimulates net exports. In addition, the resulting increase in asset
values directly improves balance sheets of financial and nonfinancial firms.
Expansionary monetary policy also helps stimulate the economy by raising the gener-
al price level, which, has direct beneficial effects on balance sheets because it leads to
a reduction in the real indebtedness of firms as explained above.
Expansionary fiscal policy is another way to promote recovery from financial
instability by stimulating aggregate demand. Stimulating aggregate demand in this
way can help restore balance sheets because it makes it easier for firms to sell their
goods, which not only improves their balance sheets, but makes it more likely that they
can pay back their loans, thereby leading to an improvement in the balance sheets of
financial institutions as well. Expansionary fiscal policy has three disadvantages rela-
tive to expansionary monetary policy as a method to recover from financial instabili-
ty. First, expansionary fiscal policy has the undesirable side effect of increasing future
government indebtedness. This can be highly problematic in situations such as the one
the Japanese are facing in which the aging of the Japanese population means that
future pension obligations will be huge, suggesting severe stress on Japanese govern-
ment finances in the future. Second, expansionary fiscal policy can take a substantial
amount of time to implement. Third, because monetary policy probably has more
direct effects on the price level, especially through its impact on inflation expectations,
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15. See Mishkin (1996). Note that not all industrialized countries are alike in their ability to use expansionary mone-
tary policy to recover from a financial crisis. If a country has a commitment to peg its exchange rate to a foreign
currency, then expansionary monetary policy may not be an available tool to promote recovery because pursuing
such a policy might force a devaluation of its currency. This problem is of course particularly acute for a small
country in a pegged exchange rate regime. Even if a country has a flexible exchange rate, expansionary monetary
policy to promote recovery might cause a depreciation of the domestic currency which is considered to be intol-
erable by the authorities, particularly in smaller countries. Clearly, a large reserve currency country like the United
States has the most flexibility to use expansionary monetary policy to reflate the economy as a tool to recover from
or reduce the probability of a financial crisis.
16. Also see Krugman (1999).it is likely to be able to raise the price level more rapidly, which has the direct positive
effects on balance sheets that we have described above.
A second method for a central bank to promote recovery from a financial crisis is
to pursue the so-called lender-of-last-resort role in which the central bank stands ready
to lend freely during a financial crisis. The lender of last resort can prevent financial
instability from growing into a full-scale financial crisis by providing funds to illiquid,
but solvent financial institutions, which would otherwise go out of business without
the support of the central bank. The lender-of-last-resort operation is thus able to stop
contagion from spreading from one financial institution to others. The lender of last
resort can also provide liquidity to financial institutions so that they do not have to pull
back lending during a crisis.
An important historical feature of successful lender of last resort operations is that
the faster the lending is done, the lower is the amount that actually has to be lent. This
fact provides support for the second principle that the faster liquidity is provided in an
international lender of last resort operation, the better. An excellent example occurred
in the aftermath of the stock market crash on October 19, 1987. At the end of that day,
in order to service their customers' accounts, securities firms needed to borrow sever-
al billion dollars to maintain orderly trading. However, given the unprecedented devel-
opments, banks were very nervous about extending further loans to these firms. Upon
learning this, the Federal Reserve engaged in an immediate lender of last resort oper-
ation, with Chairman Greenspan making an announcement before the market opened
on October 20 of the Federal Reserve's "readiness to serve as a source of liquidity to
support the economic and financial system." In addition to this announcement, the Fed
made it clear that it would provide liquidity to banks making loans to the securities
industry. Indeed, what is striking about this episode is that the extremely quick inter-
vention of the Fed resulted not only in a negligible impact on the economy of the stock
market crash, but also meant that the amount of liquidity that the Fed needed to sup-
ply to the economy was not very large (see Mishkin (1991).
Although a central bank's role as a lender of last resort has the benefit of pre-
venting financial crises, it does have a cost. The lender-of-last-resort role leads to
expectations that financial institutions will be subject to safety net, with the result that
creditors to these institutions may not feel as strong an incentive to monitor these insti-
tutions to prevent them from taking on too much risk. There is thus a tradeoff between
the moral hazard cost of the lender-of-last-resort role and the benefits of a lender-of-
last-resort role in preventing financial crises.
The asymmetric information view of financial crises thus does see a danger in too
liberal a use of the lender-of-last-resort activities on the part of central banks. The
29lender-of-last-resort role must be used sparingly in order to keep moral hazard from
getting out of hand argues against such intervention unless it is absolutely necessary.
The lender-of-last-resort role should, therefore, occur very infrequently, and parts of
the financial system that are likely to be the beneficiaries of a lender of last resort need
to be regulated and supervised along the lines described above to minimize the moral
hazard problem that the existence of a lender of last resort creates.
7.2. Emerging Market Countries
Institutional features of the financial systems in emerging market countries imply that
it may be far more difficult for the central bank to promote recovery from a financial
crisis. As mentioned before, many emerging market countries have much of their debt
denominated in foreign currency. Furthermore, their past record of high and variable
inflation has resulted in debt contracts of very short duration, and expansionary mon-
etary is likely to cause expected inflation to rise dramatically.
As a result of these institutional features, a central bank in an emerging market
country can no longer use expansionary monetary policy to promote recovery from a
financial crisis. Indeed, this is probably the worst thing it can do. Suppose that the pol-
icy prescription for an industrialized country to pursue expansionary monetary policy
and reflate the economy were followed in an emerging market country with the above
institutional structure. In this case the expansionary monetary policy is likely to cause
the domestic currency to depreciate sharply and may also lead to a dramatic surge in
expected inflation. As we have seen before, the depreciation of the domestic currency
leads to a deterioration in firms' and banks' balance sheets because much of their debt
is denominated in foreign currency, thus raising the burden of indebtedness and low-
ering banks' and firms' net worth. In addition, the possible upward jump on expected
inflation is likely to cause interest rates to rise because lenders need to be protected
from the loss of purchasing power when they lend. As we have also seen, the result-
ing rise in interest rates causes interest payments to soar and the cash flow of house-
holds and firms to decline. Again the result is a deterioration in households' and firms'
balance sheets, and potentially greater loan losses to banking institutions. Also
because debt contracts are of very short duration, the rise in the price level from expan-
sionary monetary policy does not affect the value of households' and firms' debts
appreciably, so there is little benefit to their balance sheets from this mechanism as
occurs in industrialized countries. 
The net result of an expansionary monetary policy in the emerging market coun-
try with the above institutional structure is that it hurts the balance sheets of house-
holds, firms, and banks. Thus, expansionary monetary policy has the opposite result to
30that found in industrialized countries after a financial crisis: it causes a deterioration
in balance sheets and therefore amplifies adverse selection and moral hazard problems
in financial markets caused by a financial crisis, rather than ameliorates them as in the
industrialized country case.
For similar reasons, lender-of-last-resort activities by a central bank in an emerg-
ing market country, may not be as successful as in an industrialized country. When the
Federal Reserve pursued a lender-of-last-resort role during the 1987 stock market
crash, there was almost no sentiment in the markets that this would lead to substan-
tially higher inflation. However, this is much less likely to be the case for an emerg-
ing market country. Given the past record on inflation, central bank lending to the
financial system in the wake of a financial crisis which expands domestic credit might
arouse fears of inflation spiraling out of control. We have already seen that if inflation
expectations rise, leading to higher interest rates and exchange rate depreciation, cash
flow and balance sheets will deteriorate making recovery from the financial crisis less
likely. The lender-of-last-resort role of a central bank must be used far more cautious-
ly in an emerging market country with the institutional structure outlined here because
central bank lending is now a two-edged sword.
The above arguments suggest that recovery from a financial crisis in many emerg-
ing market countries is a much more complicated exercise than it is for industrialized
countries. Expansionary monetary policy is not an option for stimulating recovery
from a financial crisis in most emerging market countries, in contrast to industrialized
countries. Monetary policy must be restricted to promoting low inflation and restoring
confidence in the domestic currency and therefore cannot be used to meet an additional
objective of stimulating recovery from a financial crisis. Indeed, a speedy recovery
from a financial crisis in an emerging market country is likely to require foreign assis-
tance because liquidity provided from foreign sources does not lead to any of the unde-
sirable consequences that result from the provision of liquidity by domestic authori-
ties.
Thus since a lender of last resort for emerging market countries is needed at times
and it cannot be provided domestically but must be provided by foreigners, there is a
strong rationale for having an international lender of last resort. However, because an
international lender of last resort creates similar moral hazard problems to those cre-
ated by a domestic lender of last resort, to operate effectively it must encourage regu-
lation and supervision of the financial system in emerging market countries that can
constrain excessive risk taking and must also operate infrequently. This is easier said
than done, and a raging debate is now taking place on whether existing international
31organizations like the International Monetary Fund are capable of performing this role
adequately.17
8. Conclusions
This survey of financial instability and the macroeconomy demonstrates the devastat-
ing effects that financial instability and crises can have on the aggregate economy.
Therefore, policymakers and particularly monetary policymakers should not be single
minded in always focusing on price stability but also need to focus on financial sta-
bility in designing their policies. However, a focus on financial stability is by no means
incompatible with the price stability goal. Price stability can help promote financial
stability because it leads to longer duration debt contracts and a sounder currency.
Under these conditions it is far more likely that debt will be denominated in domestic
currency and be longer term. As we have seen, the move toward this type of debt struc-
ture leaves a country much less vulnerable to financial instability and makes it easier
for policymakers to extricate a country from a financial crisis if it occurs.
The analysis here also demonstrates the dangers of unexpected disinflation and
deflation to industrialized countries. Thus it provides emphasis to the message that the
pursuit of price stability should involve a concerted effort on the part of central banks
to avoid deflation. Another way of saying this is that concerns about financial insta-
bility should keep central bankers from falling into the "You never can be too rich or
too thin" fallacy. Being too thin can certainly be damaging to your health - however,
maybe this is not true for being too rich - and similarly inflation can be too low.
Indeed, one of the attractive features of inflation targeting as a strategy for monetary
policy is that, if done properly, it can help prevent financial instability by making sure
that deflation will not occur.18
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17. See Calomiris (1998), Feldstein (1998), Eichengreen (1999), and Mishkin (1999a).
18. See Mishkin (1999c) and Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin and Posen (1999).References
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